They must either leave the English and return, or withdraw to some place a mile or two from them. “If you do not do so, and if, in consequence thereof, any of your men are wounded or killed, you must not blame the Chinese . As they have told us, so we write. As soon as you receive this, write quickly to say whether you will remain or retreat. The Chinese say that if the Koolas follow you, you are not to receive them. The attack will be made at night on the 3rd Labyee-gyaw Tobodwai, 1236 (23rd February, 1875). Above 3,000 and about 4,000 men are collecting and surrounding you. We think it will be wise for you to retreat.”
These letters were not willingly shown to Colonel Browne, but being delivered to his Burmese before his eyes, he insisted upon reading them, and took copies of them.
Lastly, the information contained in the cotton agents’ letters was confirmed and amplified a few days later by a Burmese scout who had also accompanied Mr. Margary into Manwyne , and by another Burmese, in the King of Burma’s employ, who was at Manwyne when Mr. Margary was murdered, and when the force destined to surprise Colonel Browne came do wn, as the Burmese in question deposed, from Momein.
Mr. Elias had been stopped at Maing-mo on the inner route, partly by Li Chên-kuo, better known to us as Li Sieh-tai, who, however, appears to have confined himself to fair words; and partly by the chief of a reclaimed tribe, who stoutly declared that, passport or no passport, Mr. Elias should not pas s into China by the road he wanted to take. He had accordingly turned back before he received intelligence of Colonel Browne’s misfortune.
Mr. Elias had with him a Chinese servant, by name Wang, who parted with him at Maing-mo, and returned through Yün Nan to H ankow. He there stated, when he was first examined, that he had been protected by a safe-conduct given him by Li Sieh-tai. This he subsequently denied, affirming that Li had only given him one of his visiting cards, which had been destroyed by t ear and wear.
Wang was sent down to Shanghae and I had him re-examined more than once. He contradicted himself no little, and, under an appearance of great simplicity, he discovered an evident anxiety to avoid all. admissions that might reflect upon the Chinese authorities. This was natural enough; but he let fall one observation of some importance on the other side, to wit, that as he came back along the road to Momei n, search was being made for the servants of Mr. Margary, should any have escaped. When caught they were to be put to death. His uncle, who was one of these, had been killed already. He wished to go in search of his corpse, but was dissuaded.
Meanwhile, most of the particulars of the Manwyne tragedy had found their way into the Indian papers, and it is probable t hat to their reproduction in China is to be attributed the recommendation now made by the Grand Secretary Li Hung-chang, G overnor-General of Chih Li, that a High Commissioner should be sent to Yün Nan. The measure, be it remembered, was that which I had in the first instance proposed, and which had been declared by the Tsu ng-li Yamên impossible.
It was now found practicable, and the Commissioner named was a man so high in office that on the score of position no obje ction could be raised to his nomination. This was Li Han-chang, the eldest brother of the Grand Secretary, Li Hung-chang; less distinguished for ability than his remarkable brother, but as Governor-General of Hu Kuang, filling one of the highes t posts that a Chinese civilian can occupy. The step had been taken without reference to me. I thought none the worse of it for this reason, and having telegraphed to your lordship that it appeared to me an omen of better things, I sent Mr. Grosvenor up to Hankow to wait upon the Governor-Gener al, Li Han-chang. Mr. Grosvenor had been for some time at Shanghae with me, under orders for Yün Nan.
He found the Governor-General civil enough, but, to all appearance disposed to make rather light of the object of his mission. His instructions, he said, related to the murder of Mr. Margary only. He ignored the attack on Colonel Browne’s mission, or the possibility of a second mission being sent by the same route. Mr. Grosvenor exhibited the passports I had obtained from the Yamên. The Governor-General inspected them as curious novelties, and threw doubt upon the genuineness of the Yamen’s seal attache d to them. There was reason to fear that little was to be expected of the High Commission.
I had half hoped that a fresh Indian mission might be immediately sanctioned, and I had thought it possible that Colonel B rowne, who was still at Shanghae, would, in that case, accompany Mr. Grosvenor to Yün Nan. His functions would have been distinct, but he would of course have proved a valuable ally. Various circumstances made this arrangement impracticable, and with my consent Colonel Browne left me for India.
Taking Mr. Grosvenor with me, I returned northwards, and I reached Tien-tsin at the beginning of August; my position, vis-à-vis the Government, now being that the High Commissioner’s reception of Mr. Grosvenor had so shaken my confidence in the intentions of the Chinese Government. as to render doubtful the expediency of dispatching Mr. Grosvenor to Yün Nan at all.
At Tien-tsin the Grand Secretary, Li Hung-chang, and the ex-Governor, Ting Jih-chang, since named Governor of Fuh Kien, we re emPowered by Decree to treat with me. They urged me strongly to return to Peking, and to allow Mr. Grosvenor to proceed to Yün Nan. I declined, unless I should receive guarantees that Her Majesty’s Government was not about to be trifled with, and being c alled on to name my guarantees, I fell back pretty nearly upon my original programme of the month of March. The reply to my first report home of the demands then made, having instructed me that Her Majesty’s Government would defer raising the question of indemnity until the result of the inquiry should be known, I made no mention of indemnity; but I demanded, if Mr. Grosvenor was to be sent, —
- That a safe passage as far as the frontier, or across it, should be promised for my Secretary (Mr. Grosvenor) and a new Indian mission.
- The immediate dispatch of a Chinese Envoy to England with a letter declaring the Emperor’s regret for what had occurred .
- The immediate issue of an Imperial Decree, in which T’sên Yü-ying, the Acting-Governor-General of Yün Nan, and Kuei Cho u, should be censured from the Throne for delay in reporting progress.
- The publication in the Peking “Gazette” of the Decree last-mentioned, as also of the Decree appointing the mission to E ngland.
- That intercourse between the Government and foreign Representatives should be immediately placed upon a better footing.
- That the irregular taxation of our general trade should at once be rectified.
- That regulation of trade across the Yün Nan frontier should be considered by any officer whom the Government of India m ight appoint as head of a new mission, and a Chinese official.
These propositions being referred to Peking, the Prince of Kung wrote to promise me an escort across the frontier of Yün N an for a new Indian mission. A Decree was obtained naming two civilians Envoys to England; also, a Decree censuring the Acting Governor-General Ts’ên for his dilatoriness. Copies of these were forwarded to me, but their publication in the “Gazette,” though guaranteed by the Grand Secretary Li, was at once declared impossible by the Tsung-li Yamên. The Decree naming the Envoys was subsequently published, but the words representing “British Government” were so placed in the text as to oblige me to object to the discourtesy. I could not get a published Decree corrected, and I could only insist upon it that the Envoys, whom there suddenly appeare d an extraordinary desire to hurry off, must not be for the present sent on their way. With a mission in England, and Mr. Grosvenor in Yün Nan, it was possibly assumed that pressure, moral or material. would be much restricted.
I had made a very great point of the publication of the papers in question. both on the general ground that, if properly framed, these Decrees constitute the most informing affirmations that can be desired of the relations of outer nations with the Chinese Empire, and for the particular reason that, in the Decree of ce nsure at all events, the people of China would see some evidence of the indisposition of the Government to identify itself with the perpetration of the Yün Nan atrocity.
They had as yet had no such evidence. The Decree appointing the High Commission of Inquiry entered into no details. The Tsung-li Yamên, indeed, professed to be almost without any. The Grand Secretary Li Hung-chang had heard at Tien-tsin of the outrage of the 22nd February, early in April. He had referred, in conversation with Mr. Mayers, the Chinese Secretary, to a letter he had received, reporting the attack on Colonel Browne, and he had remarked that it was singular no mention should have been made of the murder of Mr. Margary . Yet, even on the 2nd of June the Yamên could only state that Yang, Acting Commander-in-chief of the Yün Nan army, and Chen , an Intendant of the province, had been sent to Manwyne to prosecute inquiry; and this, although placards referring to the outrage had appeared in Peking, being duplicates of placards posted in a city in Ssǔ Ch’uan; while, in Hu Nan, a magistrate to whom a British missionary had applied in his difficulty, referred the applicant to the f ate of Mr. Margary as a warning.
These circumstances apart, it was not to me comprehensible that the Central Government should have been left upwards of th ree months without information, more or less definite. In no country in the world do official reports more abound. Events of far less gravity than the Yün Nan affair would instantly have become the subject of voluminous memorials.
My own version of what had occurred on the frontier had been given after my return to Tien-tsin, not only in conversation with the Grand Secretary, but in a note dated 20th August, addressed to the Prince of Kung. I should have preferred to be less explicit until later, but it was urged, plausibly enough, that the Chinese Government k new not of what precise sin its servants were accused.
But to return; as I have stated, the Grand Secretary Li’s engagement regarding the publication of the Decree of censure had been set at n ought by the Yamên; the Minister who declined to give effect to it observing to Mr. Mayers, the Chinese Secretary, whom I had sent before me t o Peking, that it did not follow that what the Grand Secretary might agree to at Tien-tsin would be ratified at Peking. On the 5th, 6th, and 7th of my guarantees, the Grand Secretary had declared himself incompetent to speak. The Tsung-li Yamên having, however, signified a willingness to treat of these, I had closed my discussion with his Excelle ncy Li, and on the 12th September, I returned to Peking.
The High Commissioner Li Han-chang, after a delay of two months, had started, on the 18th August, for Yün Nan. Shortly after I was given to understand that Li Sieh-tai had been brought a prisoner to the capital of the province. This was an indication of change worthy of attention. The name of Li Chên-kuo had been put forward by me on receipt of the first telegram from India as that of the one person k nown by name as connected with the attack. Yet he had been sent, after the attack, by the Acting Governor-General Ts’ên Yû-ying to Burma with a copy of the Decree an nouncing the accession of the new Emperor of China, and probably with a copy of the year’s almanac. These are forms observed in the intercourse between China and her tributary neighbours. The officials usually deputed are members of the establishment of the province conterminous with the tributary State; civilians filling the higher provincial offices; men of higher grade than Li Chên-kuo, who had but local military rank. The selection of such a man at such a moment, and the somewhat distinguished reception accorded him in Burma, him in Burma, had naturally seemed to the Indian Government, then on the point of enterin g into negotiations with the Government of Burma, to require special explanation, and it was exacted accordingly.
On the side of China, meanwhile there had been, earlier, an attempt to produce an impression that the most either Li Chên- kuo or any other official in Yün Nan could be charged with, was neglect of duty in not preventing the attack upon Colonel Browne; this being attributed to the savage tribes along the common border of Yün Nan and Burma. Later, a disposition was shown to admit that Li Chên-kuo was more directly culpable than any other official, but still gui lty of nothing worthy of death, as he was certainly not responsible for the murder of Mr. Margary. The inexpediency of requiring his life had further been urged upon me, on the ground that he was the one person capable of restraining the wild people through whose country we were about to trade. He was known, as I have said, to have been a staunch adherent of the Imperial Government throughout the Mahometan rebellio n in Yün Nan, and I had attributed to this in no small degree the anxiety manifested to screen him. His arrest proved to be a fact. I have now every reason to believe that he was either decoyed to Yünnan-fu, or captured elsewhere by stratagem.
When I returned to Peking on the 12th September, I found that in reality I had effected nothing towards securing improvement in respect of diplomatic or commercial intercourse, and without some security in thi s direction I had, I felt, no guarantees in the sense I required. The late Grand Secretary, Wênsiang, though authorized, on account of ill-health, to absent himself from Court and from all duties requiring his appearance in public, was still the real director of foreign affairs in the Tsung-li Yamên. It was mainly due to the influence of this distinguished official that, in 1860, this Yamên, the Chinese Foreign Office, b ad been founded. From the beginning of the late reign, in 1861, when the Camarilla was overthrown which, under the deceased sovereign, had terribly misgoverned the Empire, and on the accession of his infant son had usurped the supreme authority, Wênsiang, as me mber of the Great Council, the real centre of rule, had made a gallant effort to restore good government to the country. Though by no means of first-rate ability, he was indefatigably industrious and thoroughly clean-handed, and he had risen d eservedly to the second highest post in the civil service. His grand defect was his jealousy of competitors, which grew with the growth of his repute for devotion to the service of the State, and this, in his latter years, made him hopelessly opinionative.
當我 9 月 12 日回到
In foreign policy he had at one time sl1own fair promise of a progressist disposition; but this had been chilled, indeed extinguished, by various disappointments experienced, some at the hands of his own count rymen, some at the hands of foreigners. His attempt to form a university at Peking, for instance, in 1867, had been actively thwarted by some of his Chinese colle agues. The Commercial Convention negotiated in 1869 had been rejected by us. These were, perhaps, the most remarkable among the checks he had sustained. He missed no opportunity of complaining bitterly of both. The missionary question was also from the first among the most irritating of his grievances. His health was now seriously shaken by long sickness, and he had lost the self-command which had once characterised him. His ambition appeared to be simply that, especially in foreign affairs, he should leave behind him a name as leader of the ultra-conservative, or reactionary, party.
It was to the Grand Secretary Wênsiang’s opposition that I am compelled to attribute a large share of the difficulties tha t at this crisis, September, 1875, I found I had to face. His irritability had made him perfectly unreasonable. On one occasion he condescended to suggest that Colonel Browne had been attacked by Mahometan rebels disguised as Chinese troops. Had it not been for the opportune appearance of the Grand Secretary Li Hung-chang, in Peking, upon business concerning him as Governor-General of Chih Li, it is possible I should not have been able to negotiate the arrangements on concession of which I eventually allowed Mr. Grosvenor to proceed on his mission. Failing some such guarantee of improvement, I was resolved rather to dispense with the mission altogether.
我不得不把大部分原因歸結于 1875 年 9 月的這次危機，這受到大臣
Of the progress of the controversy I shall say little. The promised discussion of the fifth, sixth, and seventh of my propositions earlier enumerated, after about a month’s deba te, came to nothing, and I was more than half prepared, as I intimated to the Tsung-li Yamên, to withdraw the Legation. I had, however, abandoned this intention, and had determined instead to send Mr. Grosvenor to England, when I was given to understand that I had been on one point or other misunderstood, and I reopened negotiations. They still halted, however, and I intimated that unless satisfactorily concluded by the 29th September, I should not after that date resume them without putting forward fresh propositions. The day of grace did pass, and but part of my demands had been agreed to. I thereupon withdrew the whole, and pointing out that what I sought was not, as the Yamên evidently supposed, the material advantage of this or that concession, so much as the guarantee of good faith that the removal of standing grievances migh t be held to afford, I now pressed for the publication either of the Decree and Memorial (of the preceding August), in whi ch the dilatoriness of Ts’ên Yü-ying, the Acting Governor-General of Yün Nan and Kuei Chou, had been censured, or of a fresh Decree, ordering that functio nary and the Momein officials to Peking.
This demand occasioned the most serious perturbation. It may fairly be contended that I should have done well to adhere to it. Had the Government yielded the point, however, I should still have been months, I might have been years, from the achievem ent of my object, which was at the same time less the conviction, always a doubtful matter, of the high officer I believed guilty, than the lesson that would be taught by the publicity of such proceedings on behalf of foreigners as the Governme nt might take. After due deliberation, I consented to substitute for the Decrees I had asked for, one that should recal the attention of the Provincial Governments to the Treaty provisions affecting right of travel under passport.
This was agreed to, and my guarantees then stood as follows: —
- A mission was to proceed to England with a letter of apology. This had been, conceded in August, and the Decree naming the Envoys, though not the object of their mission, had been publ ished in the Gazette. As stated above, I had had to object to the form in which the British Government had been mentioned and I now thought it b etter that the Envoys should not go home until Mr. Grosvenor’s inquiry had taken place. They must otherwise have been the bearers of an apology for an offence not proved or admitted, by tender of which a due measure of reparation was to be abated.
- The Chinese Government was to escort a mission, whether going or coming, across the Yün Nan frontier. This bad been conceded in September.
- There was published in the Gazette of the 28th September a Decree replying to a Memorial from the Tsung-li Yamên upon d iplomatic intercourse. The Memorial itself was published the following day. Both were valuable documents, of which I shall have more to say.
3、9 月 28 日在公報刊登了一項法令，在外交過程中回應了總理衙門的紀念碑。紀念館本身于次日出版。兩者都是有價値的檔，我將有更多的話要說。
經査，該文出自 Correspondence respecting the attack on the Indian Expedition to western China, and the murder of Mr. Margary: presented t o both houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1876, London: Harrison, 
Prince of Kung 直譯爲「恭王」，當爲恭親王奕訢。
T’sên Yü-ying 譯爲
李鴻章對此殊感意外。因爲長兄 李瀚章從未辦過洋務，幕僚中也無精通此事之人，所面對的 岑毓英則是以跋扈著稱，邊境文武皆其心腹。
而「Li Sieh-tai」是最頭疼的一箇。經檢索，Li Sieh-tai 也見於：Samuel Wells Williams: The Middle Kingdom: a survey of the geography, government, literature, social life, arts and history of the Chinese empire and its inhabitant s, Routledge, 2005, pp. 721-722.
Major Sladen’s mission, owing to the admirable qualities of its leader, made so fair an impression upon the natives along his route that upon his return in 1873 his progress was materially assisted, instead of retarded, by them as far as Momein. In the years intervening the Imam at Talí, with about forty thousand of his followers, had been hemmed in by the Chinese forces under the leadership of Li Sieh-tai, or Brigadier Li. The Mohainmedans felt their weakness against such odds, and the so-called Sultan Suleiman sent his son Hassan to London to Mr. Margary intimated that he thought there were intrigues going on at Manwyne adverse to the advance of the mission; but Brigadier Li, who treated him there with great honor, did every thing to prormote his journey to Bhamo.
The arrangements as to routes and escorts were at last completed so far as to allow the party finally to leave Bhamo February 3, 1875; it numbered nearly fifty persons in all, together with a Burmese guard of one hundred and fifty. The rivalries and deceptions of the Kakhyen tribes proved to be worse than in 1868, and progress was slower from the difficulty of providing animals for transport. By the 18th it had crossed the frontier, and the next morning Mr. Margary left, with five Chinese, for Manwyne, to arrange there for its reception by Brigadier Li. Increased dissensions among the tribes as to escort, transport, and pay led Colonel Browne to push on after him with a guard so as to reach that town and find some competent authority to aid his expedition. Many signs of serious opposition had by this time manifested themselves; and when he was preparing to start from Seray on the 23d, large bodies of armed men were seen on the opposite hills coming to attack the British. A Burmese messenger also arrived from Manwyne with letters giving an account of the horrid murder of Mr. Margary and his attendants by the treacherous officials there on the 20th.
也見於 John Anderson: Mandalay to Momien: A Narrative of the Two Expeditions to Western China of 1868 and 1875, Under Colonel Edw ard B. Sladen and Colonel Horace Browne, Macmillan, 1876, p. 38. 此書提及 Li Sieh-tai 次數較多，下僅引較爲集中的一處：
The frontier trade had been materially interrupted, partly by the desolation caused by the internecine warfare, and partly by the depredations of imperial Chinese partisans. Of these, the most dreaded leader was a Burman Chinese, known as Li-sieh-tai, a faithful officer of the old régime, who had established himself on the borders of Yunnan, and waged a guerilla war against the Panthays and their friends. His name is Li, and his so-called small name is Chun-kwo, while from his mother having been a Burmese, he is also known as Li-haon-mien, or Li the Burman. As having been raised to the rank of a Sieh-tai in the Chinese army, he was called Li-sieh-tai or Brigadier Li. (A distinguished continental Chinese scholar has informod me that this title is a civil one, denoting commissioner. In the absence of the Chinese characters, the exact title of this functionary cannot be given.)
該文註腳說道 sieh-tai 是清軍的軍銜。屈春海、倪曉一